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Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of managerial agency costs in nancial conglomeration. We
model conglomeration as the integration of commercial and investment banking in one orga-
nizational unit where bank managers accomplish both activities. We assume that managers
di¤er in their abilities to undertake the individual tasks. The higher is a managers ability in
undertaking one task, the lower is her disutility of e¤ort for that activity and the higher is
her disutility of e¤ort for the other task. When there is no managerial moral hazard, it is not
optimal for the bank to form a conglomerate. We show that under managerial moral hazard,
forming a conglomerate may be in the banks interest because it may entail lower agency costs
and a larger group of borrowers to fund.
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1 Introduction
What is the optimal scope of a banks activities? A few would deny the benets of nancial
conglomeration, but the determinants of the scope and size of a banks activities are not well-
dened. This paper focuses on the role of agency costs in determining bank size and whether banks
should be organized as nancial conglomerates or specialized intermediaries.
The idea developed in the paper is that under nancial conglomeration bank managerse¤orts
may be a source of economies of scope. We show that managerial agency costs may be lower when
banks engage in multiple activities, e.g. lending and non-lending nancial services, rather than
specialize in individual activities. We argue that nancial conglomeration occurs when the agency
cost of providing a set of services by generalist bank managers is lower than the agency cost of
providing the same set of services by specialist bank managers.1 In fact, conglomeration may entail
a reduction in agency costs because generalist bank managers accomplish a multiplicity of tasks:
their compensation can be conditioned on the success of more than one task.2
In recent years, we could observe the appearance of nancial conglomerates engaging in tra-
ditional banking as well as other, non-interest income generating business such as insurance or
investment banking. The process has been supported by regulatory changes that abolished the
limits to the formation of nancial conglomerates both in Europe and the US.3 Nevertheless, in
most countries conglomerates and specialized banks coexist and nancial institutions di¤er in the
extent they diversify their activities. The results of our analysis are consistent with this observa-
tion. We suggest that managerial agency costs a¤ect whether a prot-maximizing bank adopts a
conglomerate structure or breaks up its organization into specialized institutions, as well as the
chosen bank size.
In the model, bank managers are agents of a prot-maximizing nancier (bank) and may perform
one or two tasks: commercial banking and investment banking. We dene commercial banking as a
combination of lending to and monitoring of an endogenously chosen set of borrowers under moral
hazard. In turn, investment banking may be any non-lending activity that brings a return on
capital. A nancially unconstrained bank maximizes prots by lending to all borrowers for whom
the moral hazard problem can be overcome through the means of monitoring and by choosing an
1A specialist banker is skilled at one type of activity whereas a generalist banker has an intermediate ability to
perform more than one banking services. We clarify below the distinction between generalist and specialist bankers.
2We analyze managerial moral hazard in nancial conglomerates without focusing on the e¤ect of conglomeration
on managerial risk-taking behavior. For an analysis of the trade-o¤ between the co-insurance benets of conglomer-
ation and managerial risk taking incentives, see Boot and Schmeits (2000) or Freixas et al. (2007).
3 In the European Union, conglomeration and universal banking has been supported by the implementation of the
Second Banking Directive in 1989. In the US, the formation of a¢ liations between commercial banks, securities rms,
and other nancial companies has been allowed by the Financial Services Modernization (or Gramm-Leach-Bliley)
Act that was enacted in 1999.
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optimal form of banking organization. An optimal organization is dened by i) a set of borrowers
to lend capital and thereby the size of the bank, ii) manager(s) to accomplish the lending and non-
lending tasks, iii) an organizational form based on the separation or integration of the lending and
non-lending tasks. We dene an integratedorganizational structure encompassing both lending
and non-lending activities a nancial conglomerate. In our context, therefore, a conglomerate is
characterized as a unied institution that assimilates the banks multiple activities.4
In the model, bank managers di¤er in their relative abilities to undertake the lending and non-
lending activities. Managers having a comparative advantage in one task are specialists in the
task whereas managers with an intermediate ability in both tasks are considered as generalists.
We model the di¤erence in managers relative abilities by their respective disutility of e¤ort to
undertake the two activities. The higher is a managers ability in undertaking one activity, the
lower is her disutility of e¤ort for the given task but the higher is her disutility of e¤ort for the other
task. Consequently, managers cannot be specialists in both the lending and non-lending activities.
Managers are therefore heterogeneous in their ability, which increases the benets of specialization
for a nancier creating an organization as a group of specialized banking units.
Our key insights are as follows. When there is no managerial moral hazard, a prot-maximizing
nancier hires bank managers based on their comparative advantages in the individual tasks. Con-
sequently, the lending and non-lending tasks will be accomplished by two specialist managers. The
corresponding organization of activities is such that commercial and investment banking services
are provided by specialized banks. In contrast, under managerial moral hazard, the size of the
agency costs determines the optimal organizational form. We show that, under managerial moral
hazard, agency costs may be lower when the nancier hires a generalist manager who undertakes
both the lending and non-lending tasks. Therefore, the nancier may maximize prots through
the integration of the two tasks within a single bank. The corresponding organizational form is a
nancial conglomerate where generalist bank managers perform both services for the banks clients.
At rst, it may seem unusual to assume that a typical bank manager accomplishes both lend-
ing and non-lending activities within the realm of one banking organization. In many nancial
conglomerates however, bank employees are relationship bankers that engage in a range of ser-
vices required by rms belonging to the banks clientele. Relationship bankers allocate loans to
corporate clients, acquire information to monitor and renegotiate existing loan agreements, act as
lead underwriter at corporate security issues, and advise their clients regarding decisions about
capital market investments. Even if in some banks, separate teams specialize in commercial and
investment banking activities, the same employees may become engaged in the provision of di¤erent
4This denition of a nancial conglomerate may di¤er from the denition applied in the earlier literature. We
provide arguments in support of our denition of a conglomerate as a unied banking institution that performs both
lending and non-lending activities below.
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types of services for a particular corporate client. For example, Citigroup is organized into two
major segments, Citicorp and Citi Holdings. Nevertheless, substantial e¤orts have been aimed at
the integration of the two units by stimulating commercial and investment bankers to put product
lines together and make joint calls on corporate clients.5 ;6
In the model, optimal hiring decisions and the choice of organizational form have important
implications for credit allocation and bank size. A prot-maximizing nancier chooses the size
of the borrower group such that funding is provided to all borrowers transparent enough to be
eligible for funding under monitoring. In particular, we assume that the e¤ectiveness of monitoring
and thereby funding possibilities depend on borrowersopacity (transparency). Less opaque (more
transparent) borrowers, can be easily monitored and thus funded. Bank size is therefore determined
by the opacity of the marginal borrower that is fundable under moral hazard and under the chosen
equilibrium organizational structure.
Our results suggest that a prot-maximizing nancier chooses to integrate rather than separate
the lending and non-lending tasks if and only if the equilibrium size of the bank for an integrated
organization is larger. In equilibrium, the prot-maximizing organizational form is the one that
entails the nancing of the larger borrower group. In other words, it is in the interest of the
prot-maximizing nancier to choose the organization such that the number of borrowers funded
in maximized. Consequently, nancial conglomerates would naturally arise when, as a consequence
of high agency costs, specialized banks have little capacity to fund nancially constrained borrowers.
Our model provides insights for the literature on the valuation e¤ects of conglomeration in the
nancial intermediation industry. Laeven and Levine (2007) nd evidence of a valuation discount
associated with nancial rms that engage in multiple activities. They argue that the discount
is due to agency problems inherent in the conglomerate structure and that economies of scope
generated by conglomeration would be eliminated by the discount. Schmid and Walter (2009) and
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) also provide evidence of a valuation discount. In contrast, Baele, De
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007), Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser (2010) and Van Lelyveld and
Knot (2009) characterize a valuation premium that may be attributed to economies of scope. Our
model shows that, under managerial moral hazard, conglomeration may bring about economies
of scope and thus a valuation premium. At the same time, when agency costs associated with
conglomeration are high, conglomerates will be characterized by a valuation discount.
The paper contributes to the literature on nancial conglomeration. Focusing on managerial
5According to media reports, Citi is creating a new unit that would o¢ cially combine the two disciplines. For
many clients, the bank has already identied a single relationship manager to handle both needs, reports CNBC.,
FierceFinance, December 17, 2008, http://www.ercenance.com/story/citi-combine-commercial-and-investment-
banking/
6Puzzling It Out at Citigroup, Commercial and Investment Bankers Try Working Together, December 18, 1998,
The New York Times
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risk-taking incentives, Boot and Schmeits (2000) argue that market discipline, i.e. investorsun-
derstanding of the risk choice of an institution, mitigates the coinsurance benets of diversication
associated with nancial conglomerates. In their model, conglomeration decreases the sensitivity
of a rms funding cost to managerial risk-taking. Consequently, under perfect market discipline,
risk-taking incentives are lower in stand-alone institutions. Under imperfect market discipline,
conglomeration may be optimal: the diversication benets may dominate the negative incentive
e¤ect on managerial risk-taking. Freixas et al. (2007) focus on the optimal organization of divi-
sions in conglomerates composed of a bank and a non-bank (insurance) units. They show that
under an integrated organizational structure the diversication benets of conglomeration may be
diminished by the increased risk-taking induced by the extension of the deposit insurance safety
net to the rms non-bank division. Rather than focusing on the trade-o¤ between the benets
of diversication and divisional risk-taking incentives, we investigate whether the integration of
individual activities an institution is engaged in into one organization may generate lower agency
rents than breaking up the institution into specialized organizations.
Complementing our paper, Ross (2007) compares universal and specialized banks from an
agency cost perspective. In his model, when the lending and non-lending tasks are mutually
independent the integration of tasks (universal banking) is optimal because it entails lower agency
costs. When tasks are complementary, however, agency costs are higher under universal banking.
If both a lending and a non-lending task have to be accomplished, a risk-averse banker incurs a
larger loss when the borrower turns out to be of low credit quality. This may distort incentives
for information acquisition and lending. In contrast to Ross (2007), we assume that without man-
agerial moral hazard, the integration of the lending and non-lending tasks is suboptimal for the
bank. We show that, under moral hazard, conglomeration may result in lower agency costs than
the allocation of tasks to nancial intermediaries that specialize in individual activities.
The empirical literature analyzing the di¤erent services banks perform focuses on the conict
of interest arising from the participation of commercial banks in the underwriting of corporate
security issues. Because of their involvement in lending, commercial banks have an informational
advantage relative to investment banks in the underwriting business. The evidence suggests that
commercial banks do not exploit their informational advantage by selling low quality securities
to the uninformed public (Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1994),
Hebb and Fraser (2002), Konishi (2002)).7 Rather than investigating the specic conict of interests
generated by commercial banksparticipation in the underwriting business, we focus on the e¤ect
of heterogenous managerial ability on the optimal organization of lending and non-lending banking
activities in a multi-task setting.
7Banksinvolvement in activities other than collecting deposits and lending has also been considered by Berlin,
John, and Saunders (1994) and Puri (1996, 1997).
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A number of papers investigated empirically whether conglomeration in banking leads to higher
cost, revenue, and operational e¢ ciency. The literature has not come to an unambiguous conclusion
in favor of either of the two organizational structures (see Allen and Rai (1996) and Berger, Hunter
and Timme (1993)). Benston (1989) and Saunders and Walter (1994) suggest that the combination
of di¤erent nancial intermediary services is revenue e¢ cient and does not increase overall risk.
Vander Vennet (2002) argues that nancial conglomerates are more cost and revenue e¢ cient than
their specialized competitors. Furthermore, in line with our results, Berger, Hancock, and Humprey
(1993) nd evidence suggesting that larger banks are more e¢ cient.
The paper is also related to the literature on multi-task moral hazard analysis. In the general
analysis of Holmström and Milgrom (1991), the e¤ort cost of performing one task may increase or
decrease in the e¤ort exerted on the other task. In our task allocation problem, we assume that
managers highly skilled in one task have a high disutility of e¤ort when undertaking the other
task. We show that even under this assumption the e¢ cient organization of tasks may demand an
integrated organizational structure (i.e. nancial conglomeration). In a related vein, Laux (2001)
provides a rationale for the allocation of multiple projects to a single agent by showing that the
multiplicity of tasks may improve on the limited liability-incentive provision trade-o¤ under moral
hazard. We show that heterogeneity in the managersabilities limits the extent to which this result
holds. Moreover, our framework allows us to address the problem of bank size.8 Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999) analyze the integration versus separation of substitute managerial tasks. They show
that, when allocating tasks to two competing agents, each collecting one signal rather than one
gathering two, the principal enhances incentives for information collection and thereby improves
the quality of decision-making. In contrast, in our model selecting one agent to undertake the two
tasks may allow the nancier to reduce agency costs and thus increase prots.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides a
benchmark solution assuming e¤orts on the two managerial tasks are observable. Section 4 provides
our solution under the assumption of managerial moral hazard and derive the condition under which
the nanciers prots are higher when choosing a conglomerate structure. Section 5 considers the
robustness of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the problem of a nancier engaged in lending as well as a non-lending activity. The
lending and non-lending activities are carried out in two subsequent periods. In the rst period,
8 Itoh (1994) also characterizes the advantages of task integration when there are small degrees of e¤ort cost
substitutability. Furthermore, Baranchuk (2008) shows that integration may be in the principals interest when
outcomes of various tasks are correlated.
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the nancier lends capital to a group of borrowers. In the second period, the nancier invests the
amount of capital available at the end of the rst period, from each borrowers project, in the
capital market. The gross expected rate of return demanded by the nancier is (1 + i).
The model has three types of agents: besides the nancier, borrowers, and managers. Each
borrower may invest in a project that requires investment I and may yield a positive outcome
R > I in case of success and 0 in case of failure. Borrowers may work or shirk on their projects.
If the borrower works, the probability of obtaining a positive outcome is pH . If the borrower
shirks, the probability of obtaining a positive outcome is pL < pH and the borrower derives private
benet of size B. Each borrower can be characterized with a level of transparency (1  s), where
s is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1]. Finally, each borrower has a specic amount of
nancial capital A, where A is uniformly distributed on the interval

0; A

.
In both periods, the nancier may hire an agent (manager). In the rst period, to support
the lending activity, the manager may monitor the borrowers and thereby reduce private benets
from B to sB. A borrower with a high s is opaque and is thus more di¢ cult to be monitored. In
what follows, we will refer to s as the opacityof the borrowers project. In the second period, the
manager may carry out the non-lending task utilizing his skills to increase the return on capital
available from loans repaid at the end of the rst period. If the manager exerts e¤ort, the probability
of earning a gross return r on invested capital is H . If the manager shirks on this second task, the
probability of earning a gross return r on invested capital is L < H .
Managers di¤er in their abilities across tasks. In particular, the e¤ort cost of carrying out the
two activities depends on the managers ability, which we denote by  2 [0; 1]. The e¤ort cost
of monitoring a borrower and thereby reducing his private benet is c1() where
dc1()
d  0 and
d2c1()
d2
 0. The e¤ort cost of earning a gross return r on invested capital is c2() where dc2()d  0
and d
2c2()
d2
 0. Essentially, the setup captures the idea that, depending on their abilities, managers
may be generalists or specialists in a particular task. Managers with a low disutility of e¤ort in
either task can be thought of as specialists. In turn, managers with an intermediate ability to
accomplish both tasks are considered as generalists. In the remaining of the paper, we will refer to
managers with  = 0 and  = 1 by the term specialist bank managers.9
Finally, the nancier may integrate or separate the two tasks by hiring one or two managers
and choose among managers with di¤erent abilities.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the nancier decides whether to hire one or two
managers for the lending and non-lending tasks. In the beginning of the rst period, the nancier
chooses the group of borrowers to nance and thereby the total amount of capital to lend. Then
borrowers exert e¤ort and the manager with the lending task monitors the borrowers. At the end of
9Notice that our specication is equivalent to assuming that a manager has ability  for one task and 1    for
the other, both e¤ort costs being decreasing in the respective managerial ability.
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the period, borrowersprojects yield a positive outcome or zero. In the second period, the manager
with the non-lending task invests the capital available at the end of the rst period. The nanciers
nal prot is realized at the end of the second period.
We make the following assumptions. Every project has a positive expected value when the
borrower works, even if the project is monitored by a specialist bank manager:
pHR (H (r   1) + 1)  I   c1(1)  0
Furthermore, the borrowers work is essential for the project to have a positive value ex-ante:
pLR (H (r   1) + 1)  I +B  0
3 Benchmark: Observable Managerial E¤ort
In this section, we provide a benchmark solution for the nanciers problem of organizing the bank
as a nancial conglomerate or creating two separate banking organizations. Our benchmark model
assumes that the managerse¤orts are observable.10
3.1 Separation
We assume here that the lending and non-lending activities are separated. We refer to the manager
with the monitoring task by the term rst managerand to the manager with the non-lending
task by the term second manager. We denote the two managerstypes by 1 and 2 and their
respective shares in the return on a borrowers project by Rm1 and Rm2 . Furthermore, we denote the
borrowers share in nal project returns by Rb. In what follows, rst we solve the nanciers credit
allocation problem for given levels of s, 1, 2. Then we solve the nanciers prot-maximization
problem to nd the equilibrium bank size and managerial types to be hired by the nancier.
Since there is no managerial moral hazard, the nancier will compensate the managers only for
the cost of exerting e¤ort:
pHRm1  c1(1)
pHHRm2  c2(2)
The borrowers e¤ort is not observable. His incentive compatibility constraint is:
pHRb  pLRb + sB
10To preserve the role of monitoring in this benchmark model, we assume that the entrepreneurs e¤ort is unob-
servable. Therefore, our benchmark model does not provide a rst-best solution. It assumes that the nancier is
informed about the e¤orts exerted by the bank managers but remains uninformed about the borrowers e¤ort choice.
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The nanciers participation constraint (for every borrower) can thus be written as:
pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pHRb   pHRm1   pHHRm2  (1 + i) (I  A)
Rearranging the constraint, we obtain the nancing condition:
A(s; 1; 2)  I +
pH
psB   pH (HRr + (1  H)R) + c1(1) + c2(2)
(1 + i)
= AB(s; 1; 2)
The nancier maximizes prots by providing funding to every borrower with a protable in-
vestment project. Consequently, for given (1; 2), the optimal amount to lend will be determined
by the level of opacity of the marginal borrower that is eligible for nancing when monitored by the
rst manager, sB (1; 2). Essentially, the level of transparency (opacity) of the marginal borrower
determines the equilibrium size of the group of borrowers funded by the nancier. We will therefore
refer to sB (1; 2) as the benchmark equilibrium bank size. As A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

,
the nanciers prots can be expressed as:
SB(s
B; 1; 2) = i
sBZ
0

I  AB(s; 1; 2)

Pr

AB(s; 1; 2)  A  AB(1; 1; 2)

ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
sB

pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pH
p
B
sB
2
  c1(1)  c2(2)
  
1  sB pHpB
A
Solving the model, we obtain the following intuitive result.
Lemma 1 When the lending and non-lending tasks are separated and the managers e¤orts are
observable, the nanciers optimal choice of the managers type is B1 = 0; 
B
2 = 1. Moreover, the
benchmark equilibrium bank size sB (0; 1) is:
sB (0; 1) =
h
B (0; 1) +
pHB
p
i
 
r
(B (0; 1))
2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp B (0; 1)
3pHB
p
where B (0; 1) = 2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CB (0; 1)] ;
and CB (0; 1) = c1 (0) + c2 (1) :
and sB 2 (0; 12).
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
When the managerse¤orts are observable, the nancier maximizes the amount of capital to
lend to borrowers and thereby its prots by hiring two specialist managers for the lending and
non-lending tasks. Since there are no agency problems on the managersside, the nancier selects
the managers with the highest ability in both tasks. The nancier does not pay agency rents, but
has to make the two managers participate by compensating them for their costs of e¤ort.
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3.2 Integration
When the lending and non-lending activities can not be separated, the nancier chooses a manager
with ability B so that prots are maximized. The nancier compensates the manager only for the
cost of exerting e¤ort:
pHHRm  c1() + c2()
The borrowers incentive constraint is:
pHRb  pLRb + sBB
The nanciers participation constraint (for every borrower) can thus be written as follows.
pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pHRb   pHHRm  (1 + i) (I  A)
Rearranging the constraint, we obtain the nancing condition:
A(s; )  I +
sB pHBp   pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + c1() + c2()
(1 + i)
= AB(s; )
Similar to the case of task separation, the threshold level of capital AB(s(); ) that is required for
the borrower to get funding decreases in the level of transparency (increases in the parameter s).
The nancier maximizes prots by lending to all borrowers that are eligible for funding. Therefore,
for given , the optimal amount to invest will be determined by the opacity of the marginal borrower.
We denote this level of opacity by sB (). The nanciers choice of sB () determines the size of the
borrower group to be funded and thereby the equilibrium bank size. The nanciers prots can be
written as:
IB(s
B () ; ) = i
sBZ
0
[I  A(s () ; )] Pr A(sB () ; )  A  AB(1; ) ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
sB

pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pHB
p
sB
2
  c1()  c2()
  
1  sB pHpB
A
Solving for the equilibrium sB(), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 When the lending and non-lending tasks can not be separated and the managers e¤orts
are observable,
i) if c1 () and c2 () are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

> 0, then the nancier maximizes prots
by choosing a manager specialized in lending B = 0.
ii) if c1 () and c2 () are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

< 0, then the nancier maximizes prots
by choosing a manager specialized in the non-lending activity B = 1.
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iii) if there exists b such that dc1d + dc2d  = 0, then there exists an interior solution B = bB and
the nancier chooses a generalist manager to accomplish both tasks.
Moreover, the benchmark equilibrium bank size sB
 
B
 2 (0; 12) and:
sB
 
B

=
h
B
 
B

+ pHBp
i
 
r
B
 
B

+ pHBp
2   3pHBp B  B
3pHB
p
where B
 
B

= 2

pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CB
 
B

;
and CB
 
B

= c1
 
B

+ c2
 
B

:
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
When the cost of the lending activity is more sensitive to the nanciers choice between a
specialist and a generalist bank manager than the cost of the non-lending task, in order to minimize
e¤ort costs, the nancier will hire a manager specialized in lending. On the other hand, when the
e¤ort cost of the non-lending activity is more sensitive to the managers ability than the e¤ort cost
of the lending task, an investment banking specialist will be hired. Finally, when the e¤orts costs of
the two tasks are equally sensitive to ; a generalist manager will be hired to perform both tasks.
The nanciers choice of the manager therefore depends on the relative sensitivity of the disu-
tilities of e¤orts to managerial ability. This is due to the fact that the nanciers expected revenue
from the lending and non-lending activities (the pledgeable income) decreases in the total disutility
of e¤orts on both tasks. Consequently, it is optimal for the nancier to select the managers ability
so that total e¤ort costs are minimized.
We characterized the nanciers optimal choice of managers and bank size assuming the sepa-
ration and the integration of tasks, under the assumption that managerial e¤ort is observable. The
optimal organizational form is determined by the size of the nanciers prots.
Proposition 1 When managerial e¤ort is observable, the nancier chooses an organization based
on the separation of lending and non-lending activities.
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
The result is not surprising. Indeed, the separation of lending and non-lending activities allows
the nancier to minimize e¤ort costs by hiring specialist managers based on their comparative
advantages in the two tasks. Given managerial e¤ort is observable, the nancier optimally chooses
to break the institution into two specialized nancial intermediaries. The total expected wage the
nancier pays as a compensation for managerial e¤ort equals the total cost of e¤ort.
In this benchmark case, it would never be in the nanciers interest to choose the integration
of tasks: when there are no managerial agency problems, conglomeration should not occur.
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4 Task Allocation Under Moral Hazard
In this section, we consider the nanciers choice of optimal task allocation under the assumption
of unobservable managerial e¤ort. First, we solve the model for the nanciers choice of equilibrium
bank size and managerial types under the assumption that the lending and non-lending tasks are
separated. Then, we consider the optimal bank size and hiring choice assuming that the nancier
may hire only one manager to execute the two tasks. Finally, we compare the nanciers prots
under the two banking organizational structures: the separation and integration of managerial
tasks.
4.1 Two Managers (Separation of Tasks)
Assume the lending and non-lending activities are separated. The nancier chooses managers with
optimal abilities 1; 

2 so that the amount of capital to lend 
S(s (1; 

2) ; 

1; 

2) is maximized.
The nancier is not capital constrained: funding is provided for every project transparent enough
so that the moral hazard problem can be overcome through the means of monitoring. The rst
manager exerts monitoring e¤ort if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds.
pHRm1  pLRm1 + c1(1)
The incentive constraint for the manager with the non-lending task is as follows.
pHHRm2  pHLRm2 + c2(2)
Given that the rst manager monitors, the borrowers incentive compatibility constraint is:
pHRb  pLRb + sB
For each borrowers project, the nanciers participation constraint can be written as:
pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pHRb   pHRm1   pHHRm2  (1 + i) (I  A)
Rearranging the constraint, we obtain the per project nancing condition:
A(s; 1; 2)  I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pH c1(1)p + pHH c2(2)pH
(1 + i)
= A(s; 1; 2)
The condition shows that the threshold level of capital A(s; 1; 2) required for the borrower to
get funding decreases in the level of the borrowers transparency (increases in the parameter s):
monitoring transparent borrowers reduces moral hazard and increases pledgeable income to a larger
extent than monitoring opaque borrowers. Furthermore, given the e¤ort cost functions c1(1) and
c2(2), the threshold level of capital required for funding decreases in the abilities of specialist
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managers skilled in their respective tasks. When hired to monitor, a manager skilled in the lending
task may benet from local information and thereby reduce borrower side moral hazard at a low
cost. In contrast, a manager skilled in the non-lending task needs substantial rents to have the
incentive to monitor. Hiring the latter for the non-lending task will, however, increase pledgeable
income and thereby eliminate funding constraints. Agency rents thus depend on the managers
disutilities of e¤orts for the two tasks. As the pledgeable income decreases in the agency rent,
credit rationing is less severe when total e¤ort costs are lower. In fact, the lower 1 and the higher
2, the lower the agency costs are.
Under the assumption that e¤orts are unobservable, the nancier has to pay agency rents to
induce the two managers to exert e¤ort on their respective tasks. Consequently, for every borrower
with a specic level of opacity s, the threshold level of own capital required to obtain funding is
higher than in the benchmark case A(s; 1; 2) > AB(s; 1; 2).
The nancier maximizes prots by lending to all borrowers eligible for funding. Therefore, for
given (1; 2), the optimal amount to lend will be determined by the level of opacity of the marginal
borrower that is eligible for nancing. We denote this level of opacity by s (1; 2) and refer to it
as the optimal bank size under the separation of tasks. As A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

,
the nanciers prots can be expressed as:
S(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)] Pr [A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)  A  A(1; 1; 2)] ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pHBp (s
)
2
 pHc1(1)p   pHHc2(2)pH
!
1
A
(1  s) pHB
p
Solving for the optimal s(1; 2) gives the following result.
Lemma 3 When the lending and non-lending tasks are separated, the equilibrium bank size is given
by s(1; 2) where
s (1; 2) =
h
S (1; 2) +
pHB
p
i
 
r
(S (1; 2))
2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp S (1; 2)
3pHB
p
where S (1; 2) = 2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CS (1; 2)] ;
and CS (1; 2) =
pH
pc1 (1) +
H
c2 (2) :
and s (1; 2) 2 (0; 12).
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
The nancier chooses managers with abilities 1; 

2 such that the amount of capital to lend
and thus prots are maximized. The equilibrium choice of manager types can easily be derived by
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expressing the derivative of the function S (s(1; 2); 1; 2) with respect to 1 and 2. By the
Envelope Theorem:
dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d1
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@1
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@1
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) s pH
p

dc1
d1

dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d2
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@2
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@2
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) s H


dc2
d2

The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 When the lending and non-lending tasks are separated, the nanciers optimal
choice of managers is such that 1 = 0; 

2 = 1. Moreover, in equilibrium
ds
d1
< 0 and ds

d2
> 0,
therefore the size of the bank s(1; 

2) is the highest possible.
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
Similar to the benchmark case of observable managerial e¤ort, when tasks are separated, the
nancier hires two specialist managers: one with a low disutility of e¤ort for the lending task and
another with a low disutility of e¤ort for the non-lending task. Since the agency rent to be paid
by the nancier to compensate the managers for their e¤orts decreases in the monitoring ability
of the rst manager (increases in 1) while decreases in the ability for the non-lending task, of the
second manager, (increases in 2) the nancier maximizes prots when hiring specialist managers
for both tasks. The nanciers choice of the managerstypes minimizes agency rents, maximizes
pledgeable income, and, consequently, the size of the borrower group to fund.
4.2 The One-Manager Case (Integration)
We assume now that e¤ort is unobservable and that the lending and non-lending tasks can not be
separated. The nancier chooses a manager with optimal ability  so that prots are maximized.
The manager monitors the project and subsequently exerts e¤ort on the non-lending task if the
following incentive condition holds:
pHHRm  pLLRm + c1() + c2()
Given the manager monitors, the borrowers incentive constraint is:
pHRb  pLRb + sB
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For every borrowers project, the nanciers participation constraint can be written as follows.
pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pHRb   pHHRm  (1 + i) (I  A)
Rearranging the constraint, we obtain the nancing condition:
A(s; )  I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pHH c1()+c2()pHH pLL
(1 + i)
= A(s; )
Similar to the case of task separation, the threshold level of capital A(s(); ) required for the
borrower to get funding decreases in the transparency of the borrower (increases in the parameter
s). Furthermore, the lower the managers disutility of e¤ort in the lending task, the lower is the
e¤ort cost of monitoring, and, at the same time, the higher is the e¤ort cost of the non-lending
activity. Specialist managers will have a low cost of e¤ort only in the task they are skilled at.
Generalist managers will have an intermediate cost of e¤ort in both tasks. The overall impact of
the managers type on credit allocation will depend on the specic form of the e¤ort cost functions
c1() and c2().
The nancier maximizes prots by lending to all borrowers that are eligible for funding. There-
fore, for given , the optimal amount to invest and the size of the bank will be determined by the
level of opacity of the marginal borrower. We denote this level of opacity by s (). The nanciers
prots can be written as:
I(s () ; ) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s () ; )] Pr [A(s () ; )  A  A(1; )] ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pH Bp (s
)
2
  pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
!
1
A
(1  s) pH B
p
Solving for s(), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 4 When the lending and non-lending tasks can not be separated, the equilibrium bank size
is given by the level of opacity s() such that
s () =
h
I () +
pHB
p
i
 
r
(I ())
2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp I ()
3pHB
p
where I () = 2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CI ()] ;
and CI () =
HpH
HpH LpL [c1 () + c2 ()] :
where s() 2 (0; 12).
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Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
The nancier chooses the managers type to maximize the amount of capital to lend and thus
prots. His equilibrium choice will depend on the form of the e¤ort cost functions, c1 (1) and
c2 (2). To show this, we express
dI(s();)
d by the Envelope Theorem.
dI (s(); )
d
=
@I (s(); )
@s
@s()
@
+
@I (s(); )
@
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) pHH
pHH   pLL s


dc1
d
+
dc2
d

The following proposition summarizes the result concerning the nanciers equilibrium choice
of the managers type.
Proposition 3 When the lending and non-lending tasks can not be separated, the nanciers choice
of the managers type depends on the form of the functions c1 () and c2 ().
i) If c1 () and c2 () are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

> 0, then the nancier maximizes prots
by choosing a specialist manager skilled in the lending task  = 0. Moreover, in equilibrium
@s
@ < 0, therefore the size of the bank s
 (0) is the highest possible.
ii) If c1 () and c2 () are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

< 0, then the nancier maximizes
prots by choosing a a specialist manager skilled in the non-lending task  = 1. Moreover,
in equilibrium @s

@ > 0, therefore the size of the bank s
 (1) is the highest possible.
iii) If there exists b such that dc1d + dc2d  = 0, then there exists an interior solution  = b and
the nancier chooses a generalist manager. In equilibrium @s

@ = 0 and again, the size of the
bank s(b) is the highest possible.
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
Again, the nancier maximizes prots by choosing a manager depending on the relative sen-
sitivity of the costs of exerting e¤ort to her ability. Moreover, the sensitivity of e¤ort costs to
managerial ability a¤ects the agency rent and pledgeable income and consequently the size of the
borrower group the nancier lends to. The nancier chooses the size of the bank such that all
borrowers for whom the moral hazard problem can be overcome receive funding. The nanciers
optimal choice of the managers type therefore always entails the largest bank size.
4.3 Integration vs Separation of Tasks
In this section we compare the nanciers prots under the separation and integration of the two
managerial tasks, in order to understand the motive to choose one or the other organizational
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structure. Since prots depend on the size of the borrower group to fund, we rst compare the
equilibrium bank size given the nanciers prot-maximizing choices of managerial types under the
integration and separation of the two managerial tasks.
Given the result in Lemma 3 and Proposition 2, when tasks are separated, the equilibrium bank
size s(0; 1) can be expressed as follows.
s (0; 1) =
h
S (0; 1) +
pHB
p
i
 
r
(S (0; 1))
2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp S (0; 1)
3pHB
p
where S (0; 1) = 2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CS (0; 1)] ;
and CS (0; 1) =
pH
pc1 (0) +
H
c2 (1) :
Let us denote the nanciers prot-maximizing choice of managerial type under task integration
by . According to Proposition 3,  2
n
0; 1;bo. Given this result and the result in Lemma 4, the
equilibrium bank size assuming the integration of tasks s() is given by the following expression.
s () =
h
I (
) + pHBp
i
 
r
(I (
))2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp I ()
3pHB
p
where I () = 2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  CI ()] ;
and CI () = HpHHpH LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] :
Using the above expressions, we dene the function s(C) as:
s (C) =
0B@
h
2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C] + pHBp
i
 
r
4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 +

pHB
p
2   2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1CA
3pHB
p
It follows that the equilibrium bank size under task separation s (0; 1) and task integration s ()
can be expressed as the same function of CS (0; 1) and CI (), respectively. Indeed:
s (0; 1) = s (CS (0; 1)) ;
s () = s (CI ()) :
The following result obtains as the function s (C) is non-increasing in C.
Lemma 5 The equilibrium bank size under the integration of tasks s () is larger than the equi-
librium bank size under the separation of tasks s (0; 1) if and only if
HpH
HpH   LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 

pH
p
c1 (0) +
H

c2 (1)

 0:
where  2
n
0; 1;bo is the nanciers choice of the managers type dened in Proposition 3.
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Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
The result in Lemma 5 is intuitive. Given the nanciers prot-maximizing choices of managerial
types in the two organizational structures, the equilibrium bank size under the separation of tasks
is larger than under the integration of the two activities when the total agency rent paid to the
managers is lower. A reduction in managerial agency costs increases the nanciers pledgeable
income and thereby allows for the funding of a larger borrower group. Whenever conglomeration
entails lower agency costs, the size of the borrower group the conglomerate lends to will be larger
than the aggregate size of the group of borrowers funded by two specialized institutions. Given
the result in Lemma 5, we are able to compare the nanciers prots under the two organizational
structures. Under the integration of tasks, the prots are:
I (s () ; ) =
i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))
  pHHpHH pLL (c1(
) + c2())  pHBp (s
())
2
!
(1 s())s()
Under task separation, the nanciers prots are:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) =
i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
0@ pHR (1 + H(r   1))
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)

  pHBp (s
(0;1))
2
1A (1 s (0; 1))s (0; 1)
The result concerning the nanciers choice of optimal banking organization follows.
Proposition 4 There exists parameters values pH ; pL; H ; L and cost functions c1(:), c2(:) such
that the nancier chooses an organization integrating the lending and non-lending tasks. In partic-
ular, the nanciers prots are higher under the integration than under the separation of the two
tasks if and only if:
HpH
HpH   LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 

pH
p
c1 (0) +
H

c2 (1)

 0:
where  2
n
0; 1;bo and b is dened in Proposition 3.
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
Even though, under the assumption that e¤ort is observable, total e¤ort costs are minimized
when the nancier hires two specialist managers for the lending and non-lending tasks, the above
proposition shows that under moral hazard, the nancier may optimally choose to hire one manager
to accomplish the two tasks. Notice that Proposition 3 states that this manager may be either a
specialist or a generalist depending on the relative sensitivity of the e¤ort costs to managerial
ability. In what follows, to focus on the most interesting case we assume that the e¤ort costs of
the two tasks are equally sensitive to managerial ability. Under this assumption  = b and the
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equilibrium organization is a nancial conglomerate where generalist bank managers perform both
the lending and non-lending tasks.
The intuition for the above result is that conglomeration allows the nancier to condition the
managers compensation on the success of multiple tasks and thereby increases the pledgeable
income. Due to this e¤ect, when the tasks can be integrated within one organization, there exists
an optimal level of managerial ability such that the expected agency cost the nancier pays for the
accomplishment of the two tasks is lower than the expected agency cost assuming the organization
is broken up into two specialized institutions. In equilibrium, the remuneration the nancier pays
to a generalist bank manager is always higher than the total remuneration paid to two specialist
bank managers (i.e. c1()+ c2() > c1(0)+ c2(1)). Nevertheless, under conglomeration, expected
agency costs may be lower, since the nancier conditions the remuneration of the generalist bank
manager on the success of both tasks. Intuitively, under conglomeration the nancier pays a higher
agency rent but pays less often than when the bank is broken up into two specialized institutions.
To interpret the result in Proposition 4 further, we characterize the circumstances that ensure
the optimality of the integration of the lending and non-lending tasks (conglomeration). The result
suggests that conglomeration is more likely if the values of p and  are low relative to the
value of HpH   LpL. In fact, p and  express the marginal productivity of managerial e¤ort
for the lending and non-lending tasks, respectively, while HpH   LpL expresses the marginal
productivity of a generalist manager exerting e¤ort on both tasks. Our result therefore states that
conglomeration is more likely when the marginal productivity of exerting e¤ort on the two tasks
is high relative to the marginal productivities of e¤ort exertion on the individual tasks. This may
occur, for instance, when p and  take intermediate values. Indeed, when p and  are high,
the agency rents to be paid to specialist bank managers to induce them to exert e¤ort are low. To
maximize prots, the nancier therefore chooses to separate the two tasks. In contrast, when p
and  are low, the agency problems are severe for specialist as well as generalist managers. Hiring
a specialist for each task will thus be in the banks interest. Consequently, conglomeration may only
be optimal when the severity of agency problems is intermediate for the individual tasks. Even in
this case, however, the equilibrium organizational form will depend on the nanciers trade-o¤
between paying managers a low compensation more often or a high compensation but less often.
Finally, Lemma 5 and Proposition 4 imply that the nancier hires a single manager to carry out
the lending and non-lending tasks when the equilibrium size of the bank is larger with an integrated
organizational structure than with an organization where the two tasks are separated. The prot-
maximizing organizational form is therefore the one that entails the nancing of the larger borrower
group. The result suggests that it is in the nanciers interest to choose the organization of the
bank so that the number of borrowers funded is maximized. An important policy implication of
this insight is that, when the purpose is to alleviate credit rationing, policy makers should not
19
necessarily aim at the regulation of a banks organizational form.
5 Robustness
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the amount of nancial capital A hold by each
borrower was uniformly distributed on the interval

0; A

. In order to check the robustness of our
results, assume instead that each borrower has a specic amount of nancial capital A, where A is
distributed on [0; A(1)], with a cumulative distribution function F and a density function f(:). We
only make a usual monotone hazard rate assumption on this distribution: [1 F (:)]f(:) is non increasing.
The following Proposition proves that our main result is robust to the introduction of this
general distribution function.
Proposition 5 Assuming a general distribution function for the nancial capital A held by bor-
rowers, the nanciers prots are higher under the integration than under the separation of the
lending and non-lending tasks if and only if agency costs under the integration of tasks are lower
than under the separation of tasks.
Proof. The Proof is in the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
Our paper analyzes the role of agency costs in determining whether it is in a banks interest to or-
ganize itself as a nancial conglomerate. We show that nancial conglomeration creates economies
of scope through the reduction of managerial agency costs to be paid to induce bank managers to
exert e¤ort for the banking task they have been assigned to. We set-up a model where conglom-
eration, i.e. the integration of lending and non-lending activities in one organization, would never
occur without managerial agency problems. In this benchmark case, a prot-maximizing nancier
optimally selects specialist bank managers based on their comparative advantages in the individual
tasks. However, under managerial moral hazard, the banks optimal organizational form is deter-
mined by the size of the expected managerial agency costs. We show that agency costs may be
lower when a generalist bank manager is hired to perform both the lending and non-lending tasks.
This result is due to the fact that the integration of tasks in one organization allows the nancier
to condition managerial compensation on the success of several tasks. A nancial conglomerate
structure where generalist bank managers perform both lending and non-lending activities for the
banks clients may therefore dominate the organization of activities into specialized institutions.
We also show that a conglomerate structure is optimal for the bank whenever it ensures a larger
group of borrowers to fund and thus a larger bank size.
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The results of our model have implications concerning the value creation in nancial conglom-
erates. The insights may reconcile the controversial evidence in relation to the existence and size of
a diversication discount for nancial conglomerates. We characterize the conditions that ensure
that the organization of lending and non-lending activities into a single bank, is benecial for a
prot-maximizing nancier. Furthermore, we show that conglomeration creates value whenever it
allows the bank to nance a larger group of borrowers.
We believe that our paper contributes to the current discussion on the optimal design of banking
organizations in the nancial intermediation industry. Focusing on the role of agency costs, we
suggest that the prot-maximizing organization may be built on a combination of lending and non-
lending activities in the same organizational unit. We point out that agency costs may a¤ect the
economies of scope generated by nancial conglomeration and therefore whether banks should be
organized as conglomerates or specialized intermediaries. The main conclusion from our analysis is
that nancial conglomerates and specialized banks should coexist and that agency costs will a¤ect
to what extent nancial institutions diversify their activities.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. For each borrower, the nancing condition provides the threshold level of
capital the borrower is required to contribute to the project to be eligible for funding. Assume that
managerial e¤ort is observable and denote this threshold level of capital by AB(s; 1; 2).
AB(s; 1; 2) = I +
pH
psB   pH (HRr + (1  H)R) + c1(1) + c2(2)
(1 + i)
The optimal amount to lend is determined by the level transparency of the marginal borrower
that is still eligible for nancing sB(1; 2). As A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

, the nanciers
prots can be expressed as:
SB(s
B; 1; 2) = i
sBZ
0

I  AB(s; 1; 2)

Pr

AB(s; 1; 2)  A  AB(1; 1; 2)

ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
sB

pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  pH
p
sBB   c1(1)  c2(2)
  
1  sB pHpB
A
In what follows, we solve for the prot-maximizing level of sB(1; 2) that determines the size of
the borrower group funded by the nancier.
dSB
dsB
=
0@ I  AB(sB; 1; 2)  1  sB
 sB
h
I  AB(sB; 1; 2) + sB2 pHpB
i 1A = 0
()
0@ pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  c1(1)  c2(2)
 

2pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  2 (c1(1) + c2(2)) + pHpB

sB + 32(s
B)2 pHpB
1A = 0
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The expression on the left hand side of the above equation is a second degree convex polynomial
ax2 + bx+ c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0. Therefore we have 2 positive roots. The polynomial
is positive for sB = 0 and negative for sB = 1. In addition, sB (1; 2) is such that sB (1; 2) < 12 .
Indeed:
dSB
dsB
(sB = 0) = I  AB(0; 1; 2)  0
dSB
dsB
(sB = 1) =  

I  AB

1
2
; 1; 2

 0
dSB
dsB
(sB =
1
2
) =  1
8
B  0
It follows that the level of borrowers transparency that determines the equilibrium bank size is
such that sB 2 (0; 12).
Moreover, by the Envelope Theorem:
dSB
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

d1
=
@SB
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

@sB
@sB(1; 2)
@1
+
@SS
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

@1
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pH
p
B
 
1  sB sB dc1
d1

dSB
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

d2
=
@SB
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

@sB
@sB(1; 2)
@2
+
@SS
 
sB(1; 2); 1; 2

@2
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pH
p
B
 
1  sB sB dc2
d2

Since

dc1
d1

> 0 and

dc2
d2

< 0, in equilibrium
dSB(s
B(1;2);1;2)
d1
< 0 and
dSB(s
B(1;2);1;2)
d2
> 0.
Consequently, when the two tasks can be separated, to maximize prots the nancier will choose
managers such that B1 = 0; 
B
2 = 1.
This implies that the benchmark equilibrium bank size sB (0; 1) is:
sB (0; 1) = =
0BBBBBB@
h
2pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  2 [c1 (1) + c2 (2)] + pHBp
i
 
vuuuuut
0BB@
2pHR [H (r   1) + 1]
 2 [c1 (1) + c2 (2)]
+pHBp
1CCA
2
  432 pHBp
 
pHR [H (r   1) + 1]
  [c1 (1) + c2 (2)]
!
1CCCCCCA
3pHB
p
=
h
B (0; 1) +
pHB
p
i
 
r
(B (0; 1))
2 +

pHB
p
2   pHBp B (0; 1)
3pHB
p
where B (0; 1) = 2 [pH (HRr + (1  H)R)  [c1 (0) + c2 (1)] ] :
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Proof of Lemma 2. For each borrower, the nancing condition provides the threshold level of
capital the borrower is required to contribute to the project to be eligible for funding. Assume
that managerial e¤ort is observable and denote this threshold level of capital by AB(s; ): The
calculation is similar to the calculation in the proof of Lemma 1. In what follows, we determine
the prot-maximizing level of sB() that determines the optimal bank size.
dIB
dsB
=
1
A
0@ [I  A(s; )] (1  s) pH Bp
 s
h
I  A(s; ) + s2 pH Bp
i
pH
B
p
1A = 0
()
0@ R (1 + H(r   1))  (c1() + c2())
 

2R (1 + H(r   1))  2(c1() + c2()) + Bp

(s) + 32(s
)2 Bp
1A = 0
The expression on the left hand side of the above equation is a second degree convex polynomial
ax2+bx+c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0:We therefore have 2 positive roots. As the polynomial
is positive for sB = 0, and negative for sB = 1, only one of the two roots is lower than one. This
root is lower than 12 , since the polynomial is negative for s
B = 12 . Indeed:
dIB
dsB
(sB = 0) = I  AB(0; )  0
dIB
dsB
(sB = 1) =  

I  AB

1
2
; 

 0
dIB
dsB
(sB =
1
2
) =  1
8
pH
B
p
 0
It follows that in equilibrium sB() 2 (0; 12).
By the Envelope Theorem,
dIB
 
sB(); 

d
=
@IB
 
sB(); 

@s
@sB()
@
+
@IB
 
sB(); 

@
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
 
1  sB sB dc1
d
+
dc2
d

It follows that we have three cases for the nanciers choice of the equilibrium B:
 If c1() and c2() are such that for all ;

dc1
d +
dc2
d

> 0, then d
I
B
d < 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager such that B = 0.
 If c1() and c2() are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

< 0, then d
I
B
d > 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager such that B = 1.
 If there exists bB such that dc1d + dc2d  = 0, then we have an interior solution such that
B = bB since d2IB(sB();)
d2
 0 as both cost functions are convex.
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sB
 
B

can therefore be expressed as follows:
sB
 
B

=
h
B
 
B

+ pHBp
i
 
r
B
 
B

+ pHBp
2   3pHBp B  B
3pHB
p
where B
 
B

= 2

pHR [H (r   1) + 1] 

c1
 
B

+ c2
 
B

.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the nanciers prot-maximizing choices of managerial types
and group of borrowers to fund, we compare the nanciers prots under the two organizational
structures: the integration and the separation of the two tasks.
SB
 
sB (0; 1) ; 0; 1
 IB  sB  B ; B
=
24 SB  sB (0; 1) ; 0; 1 SB  sB  B ; 0; 1
+ i
(1+i)2
1
A
pHB
p ([c1 (
) + c2 ()]  [c1 (0) + c2 (1)]) (1  sB
 
B

)sB
 
B

35 :
As SB
 
sB (0; 1) ; 0; 1
 SB  sB  B ; 0; 1  0 because sB (0; 1) = ArgmaxSB (:; 0; 1)	 ; and
dc2()
d  0 and dc1()d  0; it is immediate that:
SB
 
sB (0; 1) ; 0; 1
 IB  sB  B ; B  0:
Proof of Lemma 3. As in the benchmark case, the nancing condition provides the threshold
level of capital the borrower needs to contribute to be eligible for funding A(s; 1; 2). Under the
assumption that the managerial e¤ort is observable, A(s; 1; 2) can be expressed as follows.
A(s; 1; 2) = I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pH c1(1)p + pHH c2(2)pH
(1 + i)
For given (1; 2), the nancier chooses the size of the bank s (1; 2) to maximize prots. As A is
uniformly distributed on

0; A

, the nanciers prots can be expressed as follows.
S(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)] Pr [A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)  A  A(1; 1; 2)] ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pHBp (s
)
2
 pHc1(1)p   pHHc2(2)pH
!
1
A
(1  s) pHB
p
In what follows, we solve for s(1; 2) :
dS
ds
=
0@ [I  A(s; 1; 2)] (1  s)
 s
h
I  A(s; 1; 2) + s2 pH Bp
i 1A = 0
()
0@ R (1 + H(r   1))  c1(1)p   H c2(2)pH(H L )
 

2R (1 + H(r   1))  2

c1(1)
p + H
c2(2)
pH(H L)

+ Bp

(s) + 32(s
)2 Bp
1A = 0
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The expression on the left hand side of the above equation is a second degree convex polynomial
ax2+bx+c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0. We therefore have 2 positive roots. As the polynomial
is positive for s = 0; and negative for s = 1, only one of the roots is lower than 1. Moreover,
s (1; 2) < 12 . Indeed:
dS
ds
(s = 0) = I  A(0; 1; 2)  0
dS
ds
(s = 1) =  

I  A

1
2
; 1; 2

 0
dS
ds
(s =
1
2
) =  1
8
i
(1 + i)2
pH
B
p
 0
Notice that S is concave:
d2S
dsds
=  2 (I  A (s; 1; 2))  (1  s) i
(1 + i)2
pHB
p
 0
s (1; 2) can therefore be expressed as follows:
s (1; 2) =
h
S(1;2)+
pHB
p
i
 
r
S(1;2)+
pHB
p
2  3pHB
p
S(1;2)
3pHB
p
where S (1; 2) = 2
h
pHR [H (r   1) + 1] 
h
pH
pc1 (1) +
H
c2 (2)
ii
.
Proof of Proposition 2. The nancier chooses the managerstypes 1; 

2 such that
S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
is maximized.
S(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2) =
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pHBp (s
)
2
 pHc1(1)p   pHHc2(2)pH
!
1
A
(1  s) pHB
p
By the Envelope Theorem:
dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d1
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@1
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@1
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) s pH
p

dc1
d1

dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d2
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@2
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@2
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) s H


dc2
d2

Since

dc1
d1

> 0 and

dc2
d2

< 0, in equilibrium d
S(s(1;2);1;2)
d1
< 0 and d
S(s(1;2);1;2)
d2
> 0.
Consequently, when the two tasks are separated, the nancier will choose managers such that
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1 = 0; 

2 = 1. Moreover,
d2S
dsd1
=
i
(1 + i)2
pH
p

dc1
d1

(2s   1)
d2S
dsd2
=
i
(1 + i)2
pHH
pH(H   L)

dc2
d2

(2s   1)
d2S
dsds
=  2 (I  A (s; 1; 2))  (1  s) i
(1 + i)2
pHB
p
 0
Furthermore,
ds
d1
=  
d2S
dsd1
d2S
dsds
ds
d2
=  
d2S
dsd2
d2S
dsds
Since s (1; 2) 2 (0; 12), ds

d1
< 0 and ds

d2
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Under the assumption that e¤ort is unobservable and tasks are integrated,
the threshold level of capital the borrower needs to contribute to be eligible for funding A(s; )
can be written as follows.
A(s; ) = I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pHH c1()+c2()pHH pLL
(1 + i)
The nancier chooses the size of the bank s() to maximize the amount of capital to lend and
thereby prots. Since A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

, for given , the nanciers prots can
be expressed as:
I(s () ; ) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s () ; )] Pr [A(s () ; )  A  A(1; )] ds
= i (F [A(1; )]  F [A(s; )])
sZ
0
[I  A(s; )] ds
=
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pH Bp (s
)
2
  pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
!
1
A
(1  s) pH B
p
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Therefore, solving for the optimal s :
dI
ds
=
0@ [I  A(s; )] (1  s)
 s
h
I  A(s; ) + s2 pH Bp
i 1A = 0
()
 
[I  A(s; )] (1  2s)  (s
)2
2
pH
B
p
!
= 0
()
0@ R (1 + H(r   1))  HpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
 

2R (1 + H(r   1))  2 HpHH pLL (c1() + c2()) + Bp

(s) + 32(s
)2 Bp
1A = 0
The expression on the left hand side of the above equation is a second degree convex polynomial
ax2+bx+c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0:We therefore have 2 positive roots. As the polynomial
is positive for s = 0, and negative for s = 1, only one of the two roots is lower than one. This
root is lower than 12 , since the polynomial is negative for s
 = 12 . Indeed:
dI
ds
(s = 0) = I  A(0; )  0
dI
ds
(s = 1) =  

I  A

1
2
; 

 0
dI
ds
(s =
1
2
) =  1
8
pH
B
p
 0
It follows that in equilibrium s() 2 (0; 12). Moreover, notice that I (s) is concave. Indeed,
d2I
dsds
=  2 (I  A (s; ))  i
(1 + i)2
(1  s) pHB
p
 0
s () can be expressed as follows:
s () =
h
I() +
pHB
p
i
 
r
I () +
pHB
p
2   3pHBp I ()
3pHB
p
where I () = 2
h
pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  HpHHpH LpL [c1 () + c2 ()]
i
.
Proof of Proposition 3. The nancier chooses the managers type  such that prots are
maximized.
I(s () ; ) =
i
(1 + i)2
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pH Bp (s
)
2
  pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
!
1
A
(1  s) pH B
p
By the Envelope Theorem,
dI (s(); )
d
=
@I (s(); )
@s
@s()
@
+
@I (s(); )
@
=   i
(1 + i)2
1
A
pHB
p
(1  s) pHH
pHH   pLL s


dc1
d
+
dc2
d

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Furthermore,
d2I
dsd
=
i
(1 + i)2
pHH
pHH   pLL

dc1
d
+
dc2
d

(2s   1)
d2I
dsds
=  2 (I  A (s; ))  i
(1 + i)2
(1  s) pHB
p
 0
Moreover,
ds
d
=  
d2I
dsd
d2I
dsds
=
i
(1+i)2
pHH
pHH pLL

dc1
d +
dc2
d

(2s   1)
2 (I  A (s; )) + i
(1+i)2
(1  s) pHBp
It follows that we have three cases for the nanciers choice of the equilibrium :
 If c1() and c2() are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

> 0, then d
I
d < 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager such that  = 0. As in equilibrium
s() < 12 , the above implies that
@s
@ < 0, i.e. the size of the bank s
 (0) is the highest
possible.
 If c1() and c2() are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

< 0, then d
I
d > 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager such that  = 1. As in equilibrium
s() < 12 , the above implies that
@s
@ > 0; i.e. the size of the bank s
 (1) is the highest
possible.
 If there exists b such that dc1d + dc2d  = 0, then we have an interior solution  = b since
d2I(s();)
d2
 0 as both cost functions are convex. In equilibrium s() < 12 and @s

@ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. We dene the expressions CS(0; 1) =
pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1) and CI(
) =
HpH
HpH LpL [c1(
) + c2()], where  =
n
0; 1;bo. Furthermore, we dene the function s (C) as
follows:
s (C) =
0BBBB@
h
2 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C] + pHBp
i
 
vuuut 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1CCCCA
3pHB
p
;
Therefore,
s (0; 1) = s (CS (0; 1)) ;
s () = s (CI ()) :
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This function s (C) is non-increasing in C:
ds (C)
dC
=
1
3pHB
p
0BBBBBBBB@
8 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]  2pHBp
2
vuuut 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
  2
1CCCCCCCCA
=
1
3pHB
p
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0BBBB@
8 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]C   2pHBp
 4
vuuut 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1CCCCA
vuuut 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
 0
Indeed, the expression in the nominator is non-positive.0BBBB@
4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]  pHBp
 2
vuuut 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1CCCCA  0
()

4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]  pHB
p
2
 4
0@ 4 [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]2 + pHBp 2
 2pHBp [pHR [H (r   1) + 1]  C]
1A
()  3

pHB
p
2
 0
As we have shown that s (C) is non-increasing in C, we can state that:
s (0; 1)  s ()
() s (CS (0; 1))  s (CI ())
() CS (0; 1)  CI ()
The result follows:
HpH
HpH   LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 

pH
p
c1 (0) +
H

c2 (1)

 0:
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Proof of Proposition 4. Given the nanciers equilibrium choices of managerial types, we
compare the prots under the separation and the integration of the two managerial tasks:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )
=
24 I (s (0; 1) ; ) I (s () ; )
+ 1
A
pHB
p

HpH
HpH LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 
h
pH
pc1 (0) +
H
c2 (1)
i
(1  s (0; 1))s (0; 1)
35 :
Moreover:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )
=
24 S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) S (s () ; 0; 1)
+ 1
A
pHB
p

HpH
HpH LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 
h
pH
pc1 (0) +
H
c2 (1)
i
(1  s ())s ()
35 :
As I (s (0; 1) ; )   I (s () ; )  0 and S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1)   S (s () ; 0; 1) because
s () = Argmax

I (:; )
	
and s (0; 1) = Argmax

S (:; 0; 1)
	
; it is immediate that:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )  0
()

HpH
HpH   LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 

pH
p
c1 (0) +
H

c2 (1)

 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that managerial e¤ort is unobservable.
 Separation. The per project nancing condition provides the threshold level of capital the
borrower needs to contribute to be eligible for funding AS(s; 1; 2). AS(s; 1; 2) can be
expressed as follows:
AS(s; 1; 2) = I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pH c1(1)p + pHH c2(2)pH
(1 + i)
The nanciers prots can be expressed as follows.
S(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)] Pr [A(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2)  A  A(1; 1; 2)] ds
=
i
1 + i
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pHBp (s
)
2
 pHc1(1)p   pHHc2(2)pH
!
1  F  AS(s; 1; 2)
In what follows, we solve for s(1; 2) :
dS
ds
=
0@ [I  A(s; 1; 2)] 1  F  AS(s; 1; 2)
 s
h
I  A(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp
i
pHB
p f
 
AS(s; 1; 2)

1A = 0
()
0B@ [1 F(A
S(s;1;2))]
pHB
p
f(AS(s;1;2))
 
h
s + (s
)2
2[I AS(s;1;2)]
pHB
p
i
1CA = 0
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By assumption, we have dds

[1 F(AS(s;1;2))]
f(AS(s;1;2))

 0
and dds

(s)2
2[I AS(s;1;2)]

=
2s[I AS(s;1;2)]+ pHBp (s)2
2[I AS(s;1;2)]  0: Consequently, S is concave.
Moreover:
dS
ds
(s = 0) =

I  AS(0; 1; 2)
 
1  F  AS(0; 1; 2)  0
dS
ds
(s = 1) =  

I  AS(1
2
; 1; 2)

pHB
p
f
 
AS(1; 1; 2)
  0
This implies that the equation d
S
ds = 0 admits a unique solution s
(1; 2) on [0; 1] :
The nancier chooses the managerstypes 1; 

2 such that 
S (s(1; 2); 1; 2) is maximized.
S(s (1; 2) ; 1; 2) =
i
1 + i
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pHBp (s
)
2
 pHc1(1)p   Hc2(2)
!
1  F  AS(s; 1; 2)
By the Envelope Theorem:
dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d1
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@1
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@1
=  
is pHp

dc1
d1

1 + i
0@ 1  F  AS(s; 1; 2)
+

I  AS(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp

f
 
AS(s; 1; 2)

1A  0
dS (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
d2
=
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@s
@s(1; 2)
@2
+
@S (s(1; 2); 1; 2)
@2
=  
is H

dc2
d2

1 + i
0@ 1  F  AS(s; 1; 2)
+

I  AS(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp

f
 
AS(s; 1; 2)

1A  0
Since

dc1
d1

> 0 and

dc2
d2

< 0, in equilibrium d
S(s(1;2);1;2)
d1
< 0 and d
S(s(1;2);1;2)
d2
> 0.
Consequently, when the two tasks are separated, the nancier will choose managers such that
1 = 0; 

2 = 1.
 Integration. Under the assumption that e¤ort is unobservable and tasks are integrated, the
threshold level of capital the borrower needs to contribute to be eligible for funding AI(s; )
can be written as follows.
AI(s; ) = I +
pH

sB
p

  pHR (1 + H(r   1)) + pHH c1()+c2()pHH pLL
(1 + i)
The nancier chooses the size of the bank s() to maximize the prots. For given , the
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nanciers prots can be expressed as:
I(s () ; ) = i
sZ
0
[I  A(s () ; )] Pr [A(s () ; )  A  A(1; )] ds
=
i
1 + i
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pH Bp (s
)
2
  pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
! 
1  F AI(s; )
Therefore,
dI
ds
=
0@ [I  A(s; )]  1  F AI(s; )
 s
h
I  AI(s; ) + s2 pH Bp
i
pH
B
pf
 
AI(s; )

1A
=
0B@ [1 F(A
I(s;))]
pHB
p
f(AI(s;))
 
h
s + (s
)2
2[I AI(s;)]
pHB
p
i
1CA = 0
By assumption, we have dds

[1 F(AI(s;))]
f(AI(s;))

 0 and
d
ds

(s)2
2[I AI(s;)]

=
2s[I AI(s;)]+ pHBp (s)2
2[I AI(s;)]  0: I is thus concave. Moreover:
dI
ds
(s = 0) =

I  AI(0; ) 1  F  AI(0; )  0
dI
ds
(s = 1) =  

I  AI(1
2
; )

pHB
p
f
 
AI(1; )
  0
This implies that the equation d
I
ds = 0 admits a unique solution s
() on [0; 1] :
The nancier chooses the managers type  such that prots are maximized.
I(s () ; ) =
i
1 + i
s
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))  pH Bp (s
)
2
  pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
! 
1  F AI(s; )
By the Envelope Theorem,
dI (s(); )
d
=
@I (s(); )
@s
@s()
@
+
@I (s(); )
@
=   i1+i pHHpHH pLL s

d[c1()+c2()]
d
0@ 1  F  AI(s; )+
I  AI(s; ) + s2 pHBp

f
 
AI(s; )

1A
It follows that we have three cases for the nanciers choice of the equilibrium :
1. If c1() and c2() are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

> 0, then d
I
d < 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager  = 0.
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2. If c1() and c2() are such that for all 

dc1
d +
dc2
d

< 0, then d
I
d > 0 and the nancier
maximizes prots by choosing a specialist manager  = 1.
3. If there exists b such that dc1d + dc2d  = 0, then we have an interior solution  = b since
d2I(s();)
d2
 0 as both cost functions are convex.
 Shape of s (:) : If we call C the total agency rent paid to the managers, by the implicit
function theorem, we have:
@s(1; 2)
@C
=  
@( dds )
@C
@( dds )
@s
:
Moreover,
@( dds )
@s  0 by concavity of  and
@
 
d
ds

@C
= i1+i
0@   [1  F (A(s; 1; 2))]  f (A(s; 1; 2)) [I  A(s; 1; 2)]
+spHBp f (A(s; 1; 2))  s
h
I  A(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp
i
pHB
p
df
dA (A(s; 1; 2))
1A
=
i
1 + i
0@   [1 F (A(s;1;2))]f(A(s;1;2))   [I  A(s; 1; 2)]
+spHBp   s
h
I  A(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp
i
pHB
p
df
dA
(A(s;1;2))
f(A(s;1;2))
1A
=
i
1 + i
0BB@  
"
pHB
p s+
h
s
pHB
p
i2
2[I A(s;1;2)]
#
  [I  A(s; 1; 2)]
+spHBp   s
h
I  A(s; 1; 2) + s2 pHBp
i
pHB
p
df
dA
(A(s;1;2))
f(A(s;1;2))
1CCA
=
i
1 + i
0BB@  
h
s
pHB
p
i2
2[I A(s;1;2)]2   1
 

1 +
s
2
pHB
p
I A(s;1;2)

spHBp
df
dA
(A(s;1;2))
f(A(s;1;2))
1CCA
 i
1 + i
0BBB@
 
h
s
pHB
p
i2
2[I A(sB ;1;2)]2   1
+
"
spHBp +
h
s
pHB
p
i2
2[I A(s;1;2)]2
#
f
1 F
1CCCA =   i1 + i
h
spHBp
i2
2 [I  A(s; 1; 2)]2
 0
The previous inequality comes, rst, from the monotone hazard rate condition which gives:
 
df
dA (A(s; 1; 2))
f (A(s; 1; 2))
 f (A(s; 1; 2))
[1  F (A(s; 1; 2))]
and, then, from the rst order condition:
[1  F (A(s; 1; 2))]
f (A(s; 1; 2))
=
264pHB
p
s+
h
spHBp
i2
2 [I  A(s; 1; 2)]
375
  [1  F (A(s; 1; 2))] + spHB
p
f (A(s; 1; 2)) =  s
h
s
2
pHB
p
i
[I  A(s; 1; 2)]
pHB
p
f (A(s; 1; 2))
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Consequently
@s(1; 2)
@C
=  
@( dds )
@C
@( dds )
@s
 0
 Optimal Organization. We have:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )
=
2666666664
I (s (0; 1) ; ) I (s () ; )
+ i1+is
 (0; 1)
2666664
0@ pHR (1 + H(r   1))
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)

  pHBp (s
(0;1))
2
1A1  F  AS(s (0; 1) ; 0; 1)
 
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))
  pHHpHH pLL (c1(
) + c2())  pHBp (s
(0;1))
2
!
1  F  AI(s (0; 1) ; )
3777775
3777777775
=
2666666666664
I (s (0; 1) ; ) I (s () ; )
+ i1+is
 (0; 1)
2666666664
0BB@
0BB@
pHR (1 + H(r   1))
  pHHpHH pLL (c1(
) + c2())
 pHBp (s
(0;1))
2
1CCA
"
F
 
AI(s (0; 1) ; )

 F  AS(s (0; 1) ; 0; 1)
#1CCA0@ pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)
 1A1  F  AS(s (0; 1) ; 0; 1)
3777777775
3777777777775
:
Hence, 
pHH
pHH   pLL (c1(
) + c2()) 

pH
p
c1(0) +
H

c2(1)

 0
=) S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )  0
because in this case, AI [s (0; 1)]  AS [s (0; 1)] and I (s (0; 1) ; ) I (s () ; )  0 because
s () = Argmax

I (:; )
	
:
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Moreover, we also have:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )
=
2666666664
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) S (s () ; 0; 1)
+ i1+is
()
2666664
0@ pHR (1 + H(r   1))
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)

  pHBp (s
())
2
1A1  F  AS(s(); 0; 1)
 
 
pHR (1 + H(r   1))
  pHHpHH pLL (c1(
) + c2())  pHBp (s
())
2
!
1  F  AI(s(); )
3777775
3777777775
=
2666666666664
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) S (s () ; 0; 1)
+ i1+is
()
2666666664
0BB@
0BB@
pHR (1 + H(r   1))
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)

 pHBp (s
(0;1))
2
1CCA
"
F
 
AI(s(); )

 F  AS(s(); 0; 1)
#1CCA
0@ pHHpHH pLL (c1() + c2())
 

pH
pc1(0) +
H
c2(1)
 1A1  F  AI(s(); )
3777777775
3777777777775
:
As S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1)   S (s () ; 0; 1)  0 because s (0; 1) = ArgmaxS (:; 0; 1)	 ; it is
immediate that: 
pHH
pHH   pLL (c1(
) + c2()) 

pH
p
c1(0) +
H

c2(1)

 0
=) S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )  0
because in this case, AI [s (0; 1)]  AS [s (0; 1)] : And nally:
S (s (0; 1) ; 0; 1) I (s () ; )  0
()

HpH
HpH   LpL [c1 (
) + c2 ()] 

pH
p
c1 (0) +
H

c2 (1)

 0:
The result therefore follows.
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